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Abstract
This article draws attention to the importance of enchantment in business ethics research. Starting from a Weberian under‑
standing of disenchantment, as a force that arises through modernity and scientific rationality, we show how rationalist 
business ethics research has become disenchanted as a consequence of the normalization of positivist, quantitative methods 
of inquiry. Such methods absent the relational and lively nature of business ethics research and detract from the ethical 
meaning that can be generated through research encounters. To address this issue, we draw on the work of political theorist 
and philosopher, Jane Bennett, using this to show how interpretive qualitative research creates possibilities for enchantment. 
We identify three opportunities for reenchanting business ethics research related to: (i) moments of novelty or disruption; 
(ii) deep, meaningful attachments to things studied; and (iii) possibilities for embodied, affective encounters. In conclusion, 
we suggest that business ethics research needs to recognize and reorient scholarship towards an appreciation of the ethical 
value of interpretive, qualitative research as a source of potential enchantment.
Keywords Qualitative research · Enchantment · Scientism · Methodology · Interpretivism
Introduction
In recent years there have been calls for a ‘deepening’ of 
business ethics research (Freeman and Greenwood 2020). 
The current editors of Journal of Business Ethics suggest 
this requires moving “beyond ‘the view from nowhere’” and 
seeking to understand the “lived experience of real human 
beings” by engaging in “thick descriptions and engagement 
with materiality” (Freeman and Greenwood 2016, p. 2). 
Here, we treat these comments as an invitation to consider 
the relationship between the axiological values that inform 
business ethics research and the methods used to generate 
knowledge. In considering the purpose of business ethics 
research, the founding editor of this journal considers ethics 
to include “all human action aimed at securing a good life” 
and improving “the human condition” (Michalos 1988, p. 1). 
Business ethics research is thereby positioned as a practice 
based on shared moral values (Werhane and Freeman 1999). 
Yet the capacity for business ethics research to deliver on 
this axiological claim is, we suggest, limited by dominant 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that shape this 
field of inquiry.
Much business ethics research is characterized by objec‑
tivism, as a set of underlying principles about how real‑
ity can be known, and positivism, as a way of producing 
knowledge (Brand 2009; Campbell and Cowton 2015; 
Crane 1999). Positivist research is associated with quantita‑
tive methods that focus on observing ethical issues directly 
and attempt to measure or count things numerically. Con‑
cerns about positivism in business ethics research are well 
articulated (Campbell and Cowton 2015; Collins 2000). 
Brigley (1995, p. 20) identifies the limitations of positivist 
approaches in researching ethical cultures, observing that the 
“positivist’s paradigm seems only capable of producing frag‑
mentary insights into the cultures of organisation”. Bain’s 
(1995, p. 14) critique of quantitative research, including the 
survey method, suggests its application in business ethics 
research is “somewhat consistent with what would result if 
serving society was not a requirement” (see also Randall and 
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Gibson 1990). Crane (1999, p. 237) argues that the “tradi‑
tion of positivist and highly quantitative approaches” may 
be responsible for the “relatively poor and unconvincing” 
quality of empirical research in the business ethics field. 
Clegg and Rhodes (2006) evoke Mills’ (1959) concern with 
the “scientization of the social ‘sciences’…[and] all forms 
of social inquiry that plundered the world through ‘smash 
and grab’ raids with a questionnaire… that [render] impor‑
tant social issues obscure and trivial” (Clegg and Rhodes 
2006, p. 172). Campbell and Cowton (2015) bemoan the 
continued “dominance of the American positivist model” 
in business ethics research, noting it is a “curious feature” 
of this academic field, which is “essentially concerned with 
the moral values in which business activity takes place—that 
authors seek to use a quantitative toolkit as their primary 
weapon” (p. s5).
This article seeks to move beyond discussion of the prob‑
lematics of positivist business ethics research by reframing 
the relationship between axiology and research methods. 
To achieve this, we draw on the concept of enchantment, 
through the work of political theorist and philosopher, Jane 
Bennett. Enchantment, we suggest, is essential in enabling 
the cultivation and enactment of more ethical business ethics 
research. However, the pursuit of enchantment in business 
ethics research is undermined by the implicit normalization 
of quantitative positivism. We draw a contrast with interpre‑
tive, qualitative research which is understood as “a situated 
activity that locates the observer in the world… [through] 
a set of interpretive, material practices” that represent and 
simultaneously transform the world (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005, p. 3). Interpretive, qualitative research is founded upon 
the principle of naturalistic inquiry and acknowledges the 
inevitable partiality of understanding phenomena. It is thus 
a paradigm, rather than simply a set of methods. We argue 
that interpretive, qualitative research, when approached as 
affect‑laden, lively, relational practice (Bennett 2001), offers 
greater possibilities for meaningful, ethical encounters and 
thus a more enchanted, ethical approach to studying busi‑
ness ethics.
We begin by discussing the concept of disenchantment, 
focusing on how it has been used to critique modernity and 
challenge scientistic ways of knowing and doing research. 
We suggest that much business ethics research has become 
disenchanted as a result of scientism and the privileging of 
positivist, quantitative methods. The stance of detachment or 
separation encouraged by scientistic business ethics research 
absents the relational, dynamic and embedded nature of 
all research. We introduce Bennett’s conceptualization of 
ethical enchantment and allied concepts of affect, research 
assemblage, encounters and entanglements. We explain how 
interpretive, qualitative research can facilitate moments of 
enchantment by honing the researcher’s “sensory receptivity 
to the marvellous specificity of things” (Bennett 2001, p. 
4). We conclude by calling for a repositioning of qualitative 
business ethics research as a site of enchantment with inher‑
ent ethical potential.
Modernity, disenchantment and knowledge 
production
The concept of disenchantment is closely associated with 
Weber (1991, 1992, 2004) who charted how modernity was 
being progressively rationalized in ways which appear to 
foreclose possibilities for enchantment (Schluchter 1981). 
‘“The fate of our times”’, Weber observed, “is character‑
ized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, 
by the ‘disenchantment of the world’”, with the result that 
the “the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated 
from public life either into the transcendental realm of mys‑
tic life or into the brotherliness (sic) of direct and personal 
human relations.’ (Weber 1991, p.155). Weber poses a dis‑
tinction between a world in which inter alia mysticism and 
other‑worldly forces resonate within our existence and offer 
meaning to our lives, and one in which technical mastery 
and rational calculation has taken hold. Echoing Kant’s dif‑
ferentiation between practical and other forms of reason 
(see Neiman 1994), Weber draws a distinction between 
formal—calculable, procedural—rationality and substan‑
tive rationality: using the latter to argue that the exercise of 
reason is associated with a withdrawal from consideration 
of ultimate ends and ethics of action. For Weber, modern 
subjects were becoming subject to formal rationalization in 
increasing areas of their life. ‘[G]oal oriented rational calcu‑
lation with the technically most adequate available methods’ 
(Weber 1978, p. 85), dominated by numerically calculable 
goals, was the new logics of life. The process of rationaliza‑
tion reduces possibilities for exercising individually differ‑
entiated conduct, such that the modern subject’s existence 
increasingly consists of disciplined work towards ends they 
did not set or choose. Important to our argument here, ration‑
alization is associated with science, as the embodiment of 
‘intellectualist rationalization’ (Weber 1991, p. 139), which 
is chronically unable to offer meaning (Weber 2004). Sci‑
ence reduces knowledge to “technical means and calcula‑
tions”, rendering the world calculable but constituting “an 
unreal realm of artificial abstractions” which seek to “grasp 
the blood‑and‑the‑sap of true life, without ever catching up 
with it” (Weber 1991, p. 141).
Weber’s discerning of the existential threat posed by sci‑
entistic rationality is further developed by Marcuse (1973, 
2002) who denounces its impoverishing effects, particularly 
when transferred from the physical into the social sciences. 
Examining the emergence of the positivist ‘science of man’ 
[sic] in the writings of Henri de Saint‑Simon, an influen‑
tial figure in the early development of the social sciences, 
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Marcuse (1973) critiques Saint‑Simon’s portrayal, which 
relies on the “mechanical and uncritical application of hab‑
its of thought [in] fields different from those in which they 
have formed” (Lather 2007, pp. 60–64, citing Hayek 1952, 
pp. 15–16). By imposing on the social sciences methods 
developed in the natural sciences, “we can no longer under‑
stand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather 
must identify knowledge with science” (Habermas 1987, p. 
4). Such an uncritically deferential attitude towards science 
gives rise to concerns about naïve realism, fallacies of mis‑
placed concreteness and pseudo‑exactitude (Haack 2012; 
Hayek 1952; Stenmark 2001).
Scientism then, is a story of rationalization, calcula‑
tion, and scientific mastery; it “encompasses a variety of 
related processes, each of which opts for the precise, regu‑
lar, constant, and reliable over the wild, spectacular, idi‑
osyncratic, and surprising” (Bennett 2001, p. 58). Scient‑
ism systematizes knowledge, instrumentalizes thinking 
and secularizes metaphysical concerns. These rationalizing 
narratives encourage a particular form of thinking which is 
associated with mathematics and scientific experimentation 
and is oriented towards “reliably controlling experience” 
(p. 58, emphasis in original). The world becomes in prin‑
ciple calculable, thus “[o]ne learns to relate to things by 
seizing upon their structure or logic, upon the principle of 
their organization, rather than… by engaging their sensuous 
appeal in a world alive with animate bodies large and small” 
(pp. 58–59).
The consequences of scientism, particularly when applied 
to the social sciences, are profound. Habermas offers an 
account of knowledge in terms of a series of interests that 
he terms “knowledge‑constitutive interests” (1987, p. 308). 
Of particular note here is the distinction between techni‑
cal cognitive interest of empirical‑analytic sciences and the 
emancipatory cognitive interest of critical social science. 
In the former, the focus is on the measurement and control 
of an objective world, whereas the latter seeks to generate 
knowledge in service of progressive human flourishing. 
The distinction made by Habermas throws the critique of 
scientism into even sharper relief. His concept of knowl‑
edge‑constitutive interests implies that scientistic research, 
specifically in the areas of the social or human sciences, is 
no longer allied to human flourishing. It is rather a technical 
process that produces only nomological knowledge; that is, a 
form of knowledge which reduces the world, human affairs, 
even consciousness, to a series of seemingly objective ‘natu‑
ral’ laws and rules to which individuals are rendered subor‑
dinate. These considerations are central to our argument that 
scientistic, positivist approaches are inimical to enchantment 
and thus conspire against doing research that serves a moral 
purpose related to improving the human condition.
The reduction and categorisation that scientistic, 
positivist research entails renders studies conducted in a 
disenchanted manner complicit with wider technologies of 
regulation and subordination. Smith (1996) uses the term 
‘relations of ruling’ to refer to the ‘complex of objecti‑
fied social relations that organise and regulate our lives in 
contemporary society’ (p. 171). Such relations—whether 
evidenced in research practices, population governance, or 
wider public texts—supplant the local, embodied, particu‑
lar and unique with generalization, abstraction, categories 
and concepts that claim universality. Scientistic, positiv‑
ist, research thereby reproduces such relations of ruling: 
objectifying both knowledge and relations between persons 
that constitute the research process. Research conducted in 
this disenchanted manner might well prove efficacious in 
subordinating organizational subjects to further regulation 
and rule. However, social scientific, and particularly busi‑
ness ethics research that is conducted in this way produces 
forms of knowledge and types of research relations that 
diminish rather than enhance the human condition.
The disenchanting effects of scientism and positivism, 
and its particular ethical implications, may be underlined 
once more by returning to Marcuse (2002). Tracing posi‑
tivism’s historical emergence in the physical and social 
sciences, Marcuse argues that positivism “is a struggle 
against all metaphysics, transcendentalisms, and ideal‑
isms as obscurantist and regressive modes of thought” 
(p. 176). Approaching the social world from a positivist, 
quantitative mindset separates “reality from all inherent 
ends… the true from the good, science from ethics” (p. 
150). Measurable, empirical, and ideally quantifiable, real‑
ity is privileged as objective—and the world of values is 
relegated to the ‘merely’ subjective. “Values may have a 
higher dignity… but they are not real and thus count less 
in the business of life… the same de‑realization affects all 
ideas which, by their very nature, cannot be verified by sci‑
entific method”; as such, “their concrete, critical content 
evaporates into the ethical or metaphysical atmosphere” 
(p. 151). Ethical philosophy, as the realm of ideals, justice 
and beauty, thereby “becomes irrational and unscientific” 
(p. 177).
Positivist quantitative research risks negating meaning 
and ethics by encouraging the creation of “a synthetically 
impoverished world of academic concreteness” (Marcuse 
2002, p. 191). Impoverishment extends to both the academic 
subject and those who are subject to their focus—objectify‑
ing and rendering both abstract. For social scientists driven 
by scientism, “the role of the subject as point of observation, 
measurement, and calculation” (p. 150) removes the need 
to think beyond the confines of facts, and this subject there‑
fore “cannot play its scientific role as ethical or aesthetic or 
political agent” (p. 150). We suggest that to conduct research 
from a position of scientism forecloses the possibility of 
enchantment and negates the significance of ethics from the 
outset.
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Disenchanted business ethics research
Disenchantment in business ethics research is associated 
with a ‘rationalist paradigm’1 (Guba 1981) that encourages 
positivist epistemology and encourages the use of quan‑
titative research methods which tend to be viewed more 
favourably as a means of producing knowledge. A premium 
is placed on the collection of “measurable data… from large 
samples… to formulate and test hypotheses” with the inten‑
tion of producing causal, generalisable propositions (Crane 
1999, p. 238; Campbell and Cowton 2015; Reinecke et al. 
2016). The normalization of positivist epistemology in busi‑
ness ethics research can be gleaned from meta‑reviews of the 
field. Collins (2000) provides an overview of the first 1523 
papers published in Journal of Business Ethics. Between 
1982 and 1999, the percentage of empirical research pub‑
lished in Journal of Business Ethics that used quantitative 
(for example survey or database methods) ranged from 78 
to 100% with a median of 94% and a slight upward trend. 
A review of ‘cross‑cultural ethics’ 1981–2003, showed that 
92% of empirical papers were quantitative (Brand 2009). 
Empirical studies of ‘ethical beliefs and behaviour in busi‑
ness organizations’ between 1974 and 1990 evidenced 81% 
quantitative research using a survey research design (Randall 
and Gibson 1990). 96% of studies of ‘ethical climate’ in 
the period 2006–2016 were found to be quantitative (New‑
man et al. 2017). The normalization of quantitative positivist 
research is further highlighted in a recent Business Ethics 
Quarterly editorial (Reinecke et al. 2016) which observes 
the extremely low number of qualitative papers being pub‑
lished in the journal, despite qualitative papers comprising 
18% of submissions overall.
The normalization of positivism in business ethics may 
be related to the academic backgrounds of many scholars 
who are trained in finance, accounting or psychology, where 
quantitative empirical methods and techniques are com‑
mon (Brand 2009). Disenchanted business ethics research 
additionally includes qualitative studies that are character‑
ised by “a relatively commonsensical and realist approach 
toward ontological and epistemological matters” and are 
based on “traditional positivistic assumptions about the 
nature of social or organizational reality and the production 
of knowledge” (Prasad and Prasad 2002, p. 6). Prasad and 
Prasad (2002) refer to this type of research as “qualitative 
positivism” because it assumes reality is “concrete, sepa‑
rate from the researcher, and cognizable through the use of 
so‑called objective methods of data collection” (p. 6; see 
also Randall and Gibson 1990). Rationalist positivist inquiry 
is of particular concern in cross‑cultural research (Brand 
2009), where we suggest it is associated with neocolonial 
power imbalances that reproduce core/periphery relations 
of knowledge production (Bell et al. 2017; Kothiyal et al. 
2018). Through its commitment to scientism, business eth‑
ics research has largely overlooked the “liberating potential” 
(Crane 1999, p. 237) of feminist, postcolonial, postmodern 
and critical scholarship which has transformed the social 
sciences and other fields of management research, such as 
organisation studies (see Laasonen et al. 2012; Lather 1991; 
Prasad and Mills 2010).
Disenchanted research is characterized by a relatively 
narrow concept of methodological rigour which is founded 
on an idealized, ideological, conception of the scientific 
method. This encourages ‘methodolatry’—a form of meth‑
odological zealotry where the perfection of technique, 
whether quantitative or qualitative, becomes fetishized (Bell 
et al. 2017). The ‘problem’ of biases provides an example 
of how scientism leads to disenchantment in business ethics 
research. Positivist business ethics research has developed an 
ideologically‑driven preoccupation with seeking to reduce, 
or even remove, social desirability bias—where individuals 
underestimate (or overestimate) the likelihood of engaging 
in socially undesirable (or desirable) behaviours or holding 
socially undesirable (or desirable) views (Chung and Mon‑
roe 2003). To address social desirability bias, researchers 
have investigated whether it is linked to gender (Dalton and 
Ortegren 2011) or religiosity (Chung and Monroe 2003). A 
related problem that preoccupies business ethics research‑
ers is interaction bias, which arises when “data collected 
from study participants… [is] biased by the presence of the 
researcher(s) conducting the study” (Miyazaki and Taylor 
2008, p. 779). To resolve this, they recommend the use of 
observational methods which remove the need for research‑
ers to interact with participants in order “to facilitate the 
purity of the data that are collected” (p. 791). As this illus‑
trates, bias tends to be treated as a source of empirical ‘error’ 
which has a “distorting effect” (Brand 2009, p. 431) on the 
‘truth’. Researchers seek to manage and remove sources of 
bias by controlling the scientific process.
Attempting to manage bias in this way “requires subscrib‑
ing to the faulty psychological notion that one’s situated 
action is the result of internal, stable, and ‘‘real’’ attitudes 
and opinions (which we can access through rigorous ques‑
tionnaires) rather than a product of situated, collective nego‑
tiation” (Jerolmack and Khan 2014, p. 201). Such efforts 
towards achieving technical mastery over method involve 
rigidifying, reducing and imposing ‘cuts’ (Barad 2007) 
which generate “a profound relational disruption between 
researcher and researched” (Hendry et al. 2018, p. 46). As 
an alternative to the notion of bias, interpretive researchers 1 Guba (1981) uses the term ‘rationalist paradigm’ to refer to a 
research approach that is associated with scientism and contrasted 
with a naturalistic, interpretive approach to inquiry.
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focus on enhancing trustworthiness2 by enhancing the “iso‑
morphism or verisimilitude between the data of an inquiry 
and the phenomena those data represent” (Guba 1981, p. 
80). While interpretive researchers remain aware of a pos‑
sible lack of trustworthiness associated with self‑reported 
data, where “a subject’s talk is [not necessarily] predictive of 
future action or an accurate account of previous behaviors” 
(Jerolmack and Khan 2014, p. 201), they decline to abstract 
“from the situations about which many claims are ultimately 
being made” and instead treat meanings and actions as “situ‑
ationally contingent” (Jerolmack and Khan 2014, p. 201). 
Further, interpretive researchers assume generalizations “are 
not possible because phenomena are intimately tied to the 
times and the contexts in which they are found” (Guba 1981, 
p. 80). Such a position, we suggest lays the foundations for 
the possibility of enchantment, as we will explore later in 
this article.
Rationalist positivist business ethics research positions 
qualitative methods as subordinate to quantitative methods 
– as deficient but occasionally useful (e.g. Reinecke et al. 
2016). Qualitative methods are recommended when studying 
topics where little prior empirical research exists, as a pre‑
cursor to more ‘rigorous’ scientific testing using quantitative 
methods (e.g. Frish and Huppenbauer 2014). Alternatively, 
they are combined with quantitative methods as part of a 
mixed methods approach, because interpretive, qualitative 
research alone is seen as insufficiently rigorous (e.g. Nut‑
tavuthisit and Thøgersen 2017). Mixed methods are thereby 
presented as a scientistic solution to a perceived ‘problem’, 
i.e. that qualitative research ‘lacks’ rigour (see also Hendry 
et al. 2018, p. 226).
To summarize, we argue that business ethics research 
is dominated by quantitative research and informed by a 
rationalist mode of thought that seeks to eliminate sources 
of potential bias and produce context‑free, generalisable 
truth claims. The relative absence of business ethics articles 
based on qualitative research suggests an ‘epistemological 
monoculture’ that “suppress[es] and choke[s] out ways of 
knowing that depart from the stringent dictates of an exag‑
gerated ideal of scientific knowledge making” (Code 2006, 
pp. 8–9, Kim and Donaldson 2015; Zyphur and Pierides 
2017). We interpret such scientism as a form of control that 
treats method as “the master narrative” (Hendry et al. 2018, 
p. 219; see also Feyerabend 1975; Law 2004). This stance of 
detachment absents the relational, dynamic and embedded 
nature of all research as inherently political and ethical (Bell 
and Willmott 2019).
Enchantment and research practice
There is a significant literature, within and beyond business 
ethics, that provides ethical critique of relations based on 
detachment and separation. The writings of Levinas, for 
example, have been used to reconceptualize ethics from a 
place of distance—where the origin of ethics is presumed 
to be based on the independent rationality of an individual’s 
judgement—to one of sensorial responsibility and affective 
proximity to the other. Authors have used these ideas to 
question the limited responsibility of already formulated eth‑
ical codes as insufficient embodiments of ethical responsibil‑
ity and to argue for a more affective, corporeal understand‑
ing of business ethics (Aasland 2007; Bevan and Corvellec 
2007; Byers and Rhodes 2007; Roberts 2001, 2003; Soares 
2007). Considering the ethics of research practice, relations 
of distance and detachment have been critiqued by quali‑
tative researchers (Lincoln 1993, 1995; Lincoln and Guba 
1985), feminist scholars (Opie 1992; Smith 1990; Stanley 
and Wise 1983), researchers in Critical Management Studies 
(Bell and Wray‑Bliss 2009; Brewis and Wray‑Bliss 2008; 
Wray‑Bliss 2003a), and those working with historically 
silenced voices and other marginalized groups (LeCompte 
1993; McLaughlin and Tierney 1993; Spivak 1990). Each 
of these constituencies have advocated for and explored 
ways of conducting research that honour its relational and 
co‑constructed nature.
The concept of enchantment, as formulated by Bennett 
(2001), offers possibilities for insightful extension of the 
above work. Bennett is an American political theorist and 
philosopher who writes on the points of intersection between 
ethics, politics and materiality. Her work offers a radical 
reassessment of the boundaries between such categories, as 
well as between the human and non‑human, the subject and 
thing, the ethical and affective. Bennett argues that charac‑
terizing the world as a site of disenchantment reproduces and 
reifies its deleterious effects. Disputing the claim that West‑
ern modernity and rationalism has led, homogeneously, to 
disenchantment, she insists that enchantment can, and does, 
arise in the contemporary world. Enchantment is a possi‑
bility within every encounter—a lively potential than can 
never be closed down and “also a comportment that can be 
fostered through deliberate strategies” (p. 4). Such strategies 
include cultivating openness to encounters by picturing the 
world as a “web of lively and mobile matter‑forms of vary‑
ing degrees of complexity” (p. 131), leading to a stance of 
“presumptive generosity” where one is rendered “more open 
to the surprise of other selves and bodies and more willing 
and able to enter into productive assemblages with them” (p. 
131). It is in such enchanted, affective, relationships that eth‑
ical responsibility for the world and its inhabitants is felt and 
enacted. As Bennett writes “to some small but irreducible 
2 The term ‘trustworthiness’, rather than ‘truth’, recognizes the 
socially constructed nature of truth statements as not simply a reflec‑
tion of objectively neutral reality but embedded in the contexts and 
situated experiences of social actors involved in their production (Gill 
et al. 2018).
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extent, one must be enamoured with existence and occasion‑
ally even enchanted in the face of it in order to be capable 
of donating some of one’s scarce mortal resources to the 
service of others” (p. 4).
Enchantment is “a temporarily immobilizing encounter” 
that “entails a state of wonder” and “interactive fascination” 
(p. 5). The ‘mood’ of enchantment begins with surprise, 
as a consequence of “meeting with something that you did 
not expect and are not fully prepared to engage”. It is the 
“pleasurable feeling of being charmed by the novel and as 
yet unprocessed encounter” or the “unheimlich (uncanny) 
feeling of being disrupted or torn out of one’s default sen‑
sory‑psychic‑intellectual disposition” (p. 5). Bennett (2001) 
argues that enchantment is connected to affect because the 
latter provides the vital ‘spark’ that enables one to become 
enchanted with one’s world. In so doing, she treats affect as 
a flow that enables relations and emphasizes the capacities 
of entities to affect and be affected—in the form of physical, 
psychological, emotional or social changes of state (Fox and 
Alldred 2017). Affects are not linear or causal but flowing; 
this invites an analytical shift away from what bodies and 
organizations are towards consideration of the “capacities 
for action, interaction, feeling and desire that are produced… 
by affective flows” (p. 402). It is important to note that affect 
is not itself ethical. Rather, flows of affect provide a medium 
and provocation which enables ethical practice to be under‑
stood as an embodied sensibility of generosity—one that 
recognizes, responds to and re‑affirms enchantment. Thus, 
Bennett argues, ethics and affect are not identical, but they 
are inseparable.
A focus on entanglements and flows goes beyond an 
account of ethics and extends to all relations, including 
those that arise through research practice. Consequently, 
enchanted research is not characterized by relations between 
an observer and the observed. Instead research is a lively 
organization of flows and entanglements within which 
knowledge is constituted. A space is thereby opened up “for 
forms of ethical practice that do not rely upon the image of 
an intrinsically hierarchical order of things” (Bennett 2010, 
p. 12, emphasis in original). Research occurs within and 
as a part of this flow—there is no outside or inside of it 
that can be observed without participation. These ideas are 
linked to the notion of the ‘research‑assemblage’—compris‑
ing researcher(s), methods, data and context—to explore the 
relational nature of “human bodies and all other material, 
social and abstract entities… [which have] no ontological 
status or integrity other than that produced through their 
relationship to other similarly contingent and ephemeral 
bodies, things and ideas” (Fox and Alldred 2015, p. 401).
The researcher—including their body as well as the 
methods or apparatus they use (Barad 2007)—forms part 
of this assemblage within the events that they are study‑
ing. Research tools and techniques (interview schedules, 
theoretical frameworks, recording and analysis technolo‑
gies) are nodes within these entanglements. They are thus 
productive and disruptive of material capabilities within a 
given research event. Assemblages draw attention to events 
and actions around which entities temporarily coalesce, 
the knowledge that this enables and inevitably precludes, 
and the flow and enchantments within this. The world can 
thus no longer be considered from the perspective of the 
researcher who imposes order and seeks to achieve ‘mas‑
tery’ by using methods to collect and analyse data (Code 
2006; Fox and Alldred 2015).
Bennett’s re‑conceptualization of ethics and knowl‑
edge production is highly relevant to our argument here. 
Its value arises from understanding ethics as a material, 
affect‑laden practice of enchanted entanglements. Within 
the research assemblage, knowledge is created in the flow 
of material relations. All knowledge is understood as situ‑
ated, as created by engaging
critically in and with the material and affective‑
political detail of situations, as natural sites of 
knowledge making inhabited by particular fallible, 
vulnerable human beings… [whose] epistemic prac‑
tices are shaped by the instituted imaginary govern‑
ing the institution of knowledge production within 
which they craft their knowledge (Code 2006, p. 117, 
emphasis in original).
The task for the researcher then, is to go beyond objec‑
tivity, diligence, and even reflexivity, and instead to 
approach research as a series of lively, entangled, ethi‑
cal encounters (McCoy 2012). In the section that follows 
we explore how interpretive qualitative research supports 
such a relational practice of ethical encounters and enables 
greater consistency between the methods used in business 
ethics and the axiological values on which this field of 
study is based.
Qualitative research as an ethics 
of relationality
We focus here on the encounters through which enchant‑
ment can arise as in the practice of qualitative research, as a 
‘state of wonder’ characterized by ‘interactive fascination’ 
and the uncanny feeling of being ‘disrupted’ from one’s 
default disposition (Bennett 2001). Interpretive, qualitative 
research can facilitate enchantment by “cultivat[ing a] form 
of perception, a discerning and meticulous attentiveness to 
the singular specificity of things” (p. 37). Richly contextu‑
alized, embodied, lived understandings of business ethics 
can be cultivated through deep cultural immersion in the 
everyday experiences of those studied.
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Moments of novelty or disruption
When moments of everyday enchantment are encountered 
in qualitative research they are, ideally, acknowledged and 
valued, rather than treated as a problem that compromises 
the ideals of scientism. Abductive and inductive forms of 
reasoning which start with a puzzle or surprise and try to 
identify the conditions that would make the phenomenon 
less puzzling (Mantere and Ketokivi 2013). Remaining 
open to the possibility of being puzzled or surprised by 
encounters with empirical phenomena, rather than using 
them to confirm preunderstandings, is a key skill that 
qualitative researchers seek to cultivate (Alvesson and 
Kärreman 2007). Attention is payed “to the paradoxical, 
the contradictory, the marginal” (Opie 1992, p. 52). We 
may ask “What is it that is left out?” (Spivak 1990, p. 18, 
also Wray‑Bliss 2003a). “[I]t is the unanticipated and the 
unexpected—the things that puzzle the researcher—that 
are of particular interest in the encounter” (Alvesson and 
Kärreman 2007, p. 1266).
Moments of novelty or disruption create, in Alvesson 
and Kärreman’s terms, ‘friction’ in the research assem‑
blage. In disenchanted research, friction may be regarded 
as a disruption to the smooth functioning linearity of the 
research process. Friction is the hypothesis that does not 
work, the data that does not fit, the numerical result that 
requires massaging away. It can cause a breakdown in the 
rationalist machinery of disenchanted research, bringing 
the application of well‑oiled, routinised calculations, and 
the desire for replicable, generalisable findings, to a grind‑
ing holt. In contrast, for qualitative researchers such break‑
downs offer the possibility of coming to genuinely novel 
insights and theoretical development. They are thus to be 
hoped for, valued, cultivated and worked with.
How then can business ethics research be conducted 
in such a way as to enable us to produce, recognise, and 
work with breakdowns? For Alvesson and Kärreman 
(2007, p. 1277), “the more a study is processual, emergent, 
open, and empirically varied and rich, the more likely an 
interesting mystery, via breakdowns, will be produced 
and solved”. Such studies are likely to be interpretive 
and qualitative, “open to the views of the research sub‑
jects… allowing them to express unconstrained voices in 
the research” (p. 1277). Research “move[s] beyond ‘the 
view from nowhere’ to understand the lived experience 
of real human beings” (Freeman and Greenwood 2016, 
p. 2). Interpretive, qualitative research provides genuine 
possibilities of enchantment in studying business ethics—
the chance to experience Bennett’s (2001) “meeting with 
something that you did not expect and are not fully pre‑
pared to engage” which gives rise to the “feeling of being 
disrupted or torn out of one’s default sensory‑psychic‑
intellectual disposition” (p. 5).
Deep, meaningful attachments to things studied
Bennett’s (2001, 2010) ideas enable research practice to be 
understood as an assemblage that is suffused with affect‑
laden entanglements. The researcher is embedded within 
these entanglements, which provoke an ethical relation to 
the site of knowledge production and the entities assembled 
within it. Research may be driven by “generous reciprocity”, 
the cultivation of vulnerability through openness and expo‑
sure of the self to claims of the other (Rhodes and Carlsen 
2018, also Wray‑Bliss 2003a). Such a non‑possessive, 
unconditional form of relating is resistant to appropriation. 
It builds on and extends the notion of relationally reflexive 
organizational research (Cunliffe and Locke 2016) which 
recognizes the pluralities of voices and identities in research 
relationships and the need to engage constructively and pro‑
ductively with them. Power relations between researchers 
and the researched may be problematized, enabling a focus 
on the space between them and the relationships constructed. 
Dialogical, “intercorporeal encounters, felt experience and 
embodied engagement” (Rhodes and Carlsen 2018, p. 1307, 
see also Diprose 2012) may be cultivated.
Interpretive, qualitative researchers seek to cultivate rela‑
tionships within the assemblage in a way that validates and 
opens up the ethical relations within it. In a reflection on 
narrative research practice, Hendry et al. (2018) speak about 
research as a “communion [in which] we become present to 
our relationships and interconnections with others” (p. 60). 
A key component in this practice is in the act of listening 
which they describe as
…not simply an act engaged with the ear. Listening 
entails bodily sensations. It means taking note of tem‑
perature, vibrations, and megahertz… Listening is a 
full ontological engagement that takes tremendous 
time, energy, and effort. (p. 95).
The researcher needs to listen with “soft ears”, listening in a 
“malleable manner” (p. 24) to the discourses that reverberate 
within an interaction. This is done not with the intention of 
extracting ‘unbiased’ knowledge from participants but rather 
as a way of engaging with the research event as a communal 
process where meaning is encountered.
In order to re‑frame relations within the research assem‑
blage, Rautio (2014) distinguishes between “participant 
observation” and “observant participation” (p. 464). In 
the former, the researcher is imagined to be at a distance 
from research ‘subjects’ whilst in the latter “the focus is on 
the relations and interactions of all of the people involved, 
researcher included” (p. 464). Such a commitment to prob‑
lematizing positivistic relations of distance and author‑
ity generate challenges. This is especially the case when 
research participants are themselves entangled in prob‑
lematic ethical relations that warrant critique. Collins and 
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Wray‑Bliss (2005; see also Wray‑Bliss 2003b) engage 
with such a challenge in ethics research which examined 
academic colleagues’ discriminatory behaviours. Drawing 
on Stanley and Wise’s (1983, p. 177) observation that we 
“owe responsibility to ‘the researched’, whether we mor‑
ally approve of them or not”, Collins and Wray‑Bliss (2005) 
reflect on the means by which respect for the humanity of 
the persons entangled in research must be maintained even 
while we may not condone their behaviour. Meaningful 
encounters in the research assemblage are not simply a mat‑
ter of ‘respecting’ the other. Research entanglements may 
go further and become disruptive and transformative. The 
authors’ commitment to anti‑discriminatory practice and to 
support the victim of discrimination meant full participa‑
tion with research subjects who exhibited discriminatory 
behaviour was not possible. However, they were still able 
to extend an ethical commitment of generosity, manifested 
by not merely condemning their colleagues’ discriminatory 
behaviour but exploring the ethically informed legitimations 
that these individuals applied in order to make sense of and 
authorize it.
Possibilities for embodied, affective encounters
Affect is a “material vibrancy” that creates “a field of forces” 
that do not necessarily “enter and animate a physical body” 
(Bennett 2010, p. xiii; see also Bell and Vachhani 2020). It 
provides the basis for flows that connect human and non‑
human materialities within research assemblages. Gherardi 
(2019) uses the notion of ‘affective ethnography’ to high‑
light the capacity for researchers to use their lived, sensory 
experience to engage affectively with other actors, texts and 
materialities and to “produce interpretations that may trans‑
form the things that they interpret” (p. 742). This way of 
thinking about affective embodiment in research “problema‑
tizes ‘what counts as a body’, noting that the word ‘body’ 
refers not only to human, individual bodies but also to any 
other living and non‑living” beings (p. 747). Embodied, 
affective ethnography also draws attention to the impor‑
tance of being or ‘becoming‑with’ as a basis for embodied 
knowing. Hendry and colleagues (2018) draw attention to 
the importance of cultivating attentiveness or ‘being pre‑
sent’ in research. Possibilities for affective encounters arise 
from being and becoming in a research assemblage where 
affective flows are experienced, rather than from extracting 
data from research settings so that it be “cut, analysed, and 
reduced to knowledge” (p. vii).
The focus of inquiry then is on encounters where affect 
may be felt, as a ‘spark’ that passes between bodies (Stew‑
art 2007). Understanding research as a series of embodied, 
affective encounters can require a more radical approach to 
using qualitative methods like interviewing. Instead of see‑
ing methods as an extractive tool for data collection, research 
is understood as a dynamic encounter, where knowledge 
is socially and intersubjectively constructed through con‑
versational dialogue. Attention is drawn to the importance 
of place in co‑creating meaning (see also Gherardi 2019). 
For example, the ‘walking’ or ‘go‑along interview’ method 
(Evans and Jones 2011) is based on the practice of physically 
being and moving through landscapes and conversing with 
participants in ways that enable them to make “connections 
to the surrounding environment”; this is suggested to help 
participants become “less likely to try and give the ‘right’ 
answer to questions that are asked” (p. 849). These methods 
seek to equalize the power relations between participants 
and researchers. While power differentials even in interpre‑
tive, qualitative research contexts cannot be completely over‑
come (Wray‑Bliss 2003c), enchanted research is oriented 
towards cultivating more collaborative, less exploitative, 
research relationships.
Discussion
If business ethics researchers neglect to critically examine 
their own practice, then their “credibility as critics and ana‑
lysts of what is going on in the world outside… is bound to 
be similarly diminished” (Butterwick and Dawson 2005, p. 
52). The positioning of business ethics research axiologi‑
cally, as a practice that is based on shared moral values 
which endeavours to improve the human condition (Mich‑
alos 1982, 1988; Werhane and Freeman 1999), necessitates 
examination of the ethical value of research practices on 
which this field of study is based.
Here, we have used Bennett’s (2001) conception of 
enchantment to question the implicit normalization of posi‑
tivist methods in business ethics research which, we sug‑
gest, encourages scientism and leads to disenchantment. 
The commitment to scientism in business ethics research 
has severely limited the capacity of business ethics research‑
ers “to ‘be’ in the world” and recognize that they “are part 
of a complex, indeterminate, and always in process sys‑
tem of relationships constituted through and in the human, 
nonhuman, and more‑than‑human” (Hendry et al. 2018, p. 
9). Interpretive, qualitative research is more conducive to 
enchantment than the prevailing norms of scientism permit. 
Through its receptivity to moments of novelty or disruption, 
cultivation of deep, meaningful attachments to things stud‑
ied, and openness to embodied, affective encounters, inter‑
pretive qualitative research invites awareness of the ethical 
obligations that flow through all material entanglements. 
Methodologically, the demand is to valorise these attach‑
ments. The research assemblage becomes a less organized, 
more democratic space in which the co‑creation of knowl‑
edge becomes embedded with practice and, potentially, a 
place of transformation. Yet not all qualitative research is 
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necessarily enchanting—for ‘qualitative positivist’ (Prasad 
and Prasad 2002) or ‘neo‑empiricist’ (Johnson, Buehring, 
Cassell and Symon 2006) research is also prone to scientistic 
tendencies. Our argument, however, is that there is much 
greater potential for enchantment in interpretive qualitative 
inquiry than can be enabled by positivist quantitative studies 
founded on scientism.
The importance of enchantment in business ethics 
research arises from its role in “conjur[ing] up, and… 
[being] rooted in, understandings and experiences of the 
world in which there is more to life than the material, the vis‑
ible or the explainable” (Jenkins 2000, p. 29). Enchantment 
introduces the possibility of unknowability, or uncertain 
knowledge, which arises from radically problematizing what 
can be known and our ability to produce knowledge (Bell 
et al. 2020). A willingness to move beyond “epistemologies 
of mastery” (Code 2006, p. 21) is necessary in order to look 
for what is silenced, and to question what it means to know. 
Enchantment positions research as a means of enabling 
surprising onto‑epistemological encounters within which 
ethics may be experienced and observed. Business ethics 
research may then be understood as a practice of ethical 
relationality (Hendry et al. 2018), “an imaginative, creative, 
proliferative entanglement” (p. 217) in which enchantment 
provides a basis for research for exploring the relationality 
“of being in relation with ourselves, others, nonhumans, and 
the more‑than‑human” (Hendry et al. 2018, p. 227). Inquiry 
is thereby positioned not as “discovery of an event or object 
or representation… [but] an ethical engagement in creativity, 
multiplicity, and indeterminacy” (p. 227). Such a positioning 
acknowledges the indeterminacy of phenomena which are 
“always emerging and in flux” and thus cannot be reduced 
“to discrete, quantifiable objects” (p. 151, see also Bell and 
Willmott 2019). Hence the practice of research is based on 
being present and open to possibilities of unknowing, as well 
as knowing (Bell et al. 2020).
As the above implies, “research cannot be separated from 
ethics” (Hendry et al. 2018, p. 174). By drawing on the notion 
of enchantment, we have emphasized the need for greater 
alignment between business ethics as the phenomena of study 
and the methodological practices through which knowledge 
about phenomena is accomplished. Specifically, we have 
argued that enchantment in the practice of business ethics 
research, enabled by moments of novelty or disruption, deep, 
meaningful attachments to things studied and embodied, affec‑
tive encounters, is necessary “before you can care about any‑
thing [else]” (Bennett 2001, p.4). This goes beyond the often 
narrowly conceived officialdom of research ethics (Bell and 
Wray‑Bliss 2009; Brewis and Wray‑Bliss 2008) and positions 
methods within assemblages that produce (ethical) enchant‑
ment and disenchantment. These arguments are relevant 
in determining the value of research in all fields of human 
inquiry. However, they are especially important in the field of 
business ethics because of the espoused axiological commit‑
ment to doing research based on shared moral values in order 
to improve the human condition.
Enchantment in business ethics research has affinities with 
other affect‑laden relational approaches such as care, Levina‑
sian or postmodernism (Clegg and Silfe 2009), which propose 
that research is a way of being that involves “the person of the 
researcher, his or her sensitivity and commitment to moral 
issues and action” (Kvale 1996, p. 117, cited in Clegg and Silfe 
2009, p. 17). There are also parallels with aesthetic approaches 
to business ethics, which emphasize the role of embodiment 
and imagination in knowing “the good and the beautiful” (Lad‑
kin 2018, p. 38). Theories developed by Bennett (2001, 2010) 
that we have drawn upon here and are aligned with feminist 
posthumanist new materialism (Barad 2007; Braidotti 2006), 
offer further radical possibilities and challenges that extend 
beyond the confines of this paper’s current concerns: possi‑
bilities that we nevertheless wish to briefly touch upon. These 
arise from three central propositions. First, a radical decenter‑
ing of the human subject entangled within relations between 
other human and non‑humans, the human subject is conceived 
not as a sovereign but as a concatenation of material relations. 
Second, ethics and ethical responsibility is understood to 
reside in these relations. It is not as custodians of human and 
non‑human others that ethical responsibility resides. Rather 
we are responsible with human and non‑human others, predi‑
cated on an ethics of enchantment. Third, being, knowing, and 
ethical responsibilities are considered to be fundamentally co‑
existent. Barad (2007) uses the term “ethico‑onto‑epistemol‑
ogy” (p. 381) to capture this sensibility. Knowledge‑making is 
thereby positioned as a “matter of ethical concern” through the 
“‘world‑making’ powers of practices of inquiry” which bring 
specific objects of study into being (Mauthner 2019, p. 669).
The focus of the researcher thereby shifts from the human 
to the de‑centred human and non‑human world of entangle‑
ments and their enchantments—positioning knowing and 
being within them. The research assemblage so conceived is 
not only a practice of knowing within entanglements but also, 
simultaneously, an ethical obligation that flows through these 
relations. Such a position acknowledges the indeterminacy of 
phenomena which are “always emerging and in flux” and thus 
cannot be reduced “to discrete, quantifiable objects” (p. 151, 
see also Bell and Willmott 2019). Inquiry is thereby positioned 
not as “discovery of an event or object or representation… 
[but] an ethical engagement in creativity, multiplicity, and 
indeterminacy” (Hendry et al. 2018, p. 227).
Conclusion
Enchantment, understood as an ethical engagement charac‑
terized by lively relations, inserts a challenge into discus‑
sions about methods in business ethics research. This article 
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has proposed that the study of business ethics would benefit 
from taking account of, and being more strongly oriented 
towards, possibilities for enchantment in research. Through 
drawing attention to the humanistic and post‑humanistic 
potential of Bennett’s (2001) conception of enchantment, 
we have called for business ethics researchers to centrally 
engage with interpretive, qualitative research as a means 
of reconnecting with the ethical purpose of business ethics 
research. By providing moments of novelty or disruption, 
cultivating meaningful attachments to things studied and 
openness to embodied, affective encounters, we have sug‑
gested that the enchantment enabled by interpretive, qualita‑
tive research encourages a decentering of objective, scien‑
tistic methods as being capable of capturing, containing, or 
honouring ethics. We therefore call upon business ethicists 
to reappraise the methodological assumptions which con‑
tribute to the rationalization of ethics, ultimately leading to 
disenchantment and foreclosing possibilities for more ethi‑
cally enchanted research practice.
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